Core Revenue of the State: The Opportunities and Challenges of State Revenue Authority (SRA) Establishment in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT: This study conducts a systematic literature review (SLR) of the opportunities and challenges surrounding the establishment of a State Revenue Authority (SRA) board for Indonesia. Drawing on comparative experiences across Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the review identifies how board structures can enhance strategic oversight, digital transformation, data governance, and integrity safeguards in revenue administration. Evidence suggests that boards add value when their mandates are clear, their composition is diverse and professional, and accountability is institutionalized through transparent reporting and performance metrics. However, autonomy alone does not guarantee stronger outcomes; revenue performance is shaped by the interaction of policy design, administrative capability, and service quality. For Indonesia, stabilizing the Core Tax Administration System (CTAS), embedding data governance under the Satu Data Indonesia and Personal Data Protection frameworks, and institutionalizing integrity measures emerge as near-term priorities. The findings contribute to global debates on tax administration reform while offering practical guidance for policymakers navigating fiscal modernization in Indonesia.

KEYWORDS: Digital Transformation, Data Governance, Governance, State Revenue Authority, Indonesia

1. INTRODUCTION

Core state revenue, comprising taxes, customs, and selected non-tax receipts, serves as the fiscal backbone of any modern state, enabling governments to finance public goods, promote equity through redistribution, and invest in long-term development. In Indonesia, domestic revenue mobilization is especially vital for realizing the objectives of national development plans, including the ambition to achieve high-income country status by 2045. Yet Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio has consistently lagged behind that of regional peers and OECD countries, constraining fiscal space and exposing the state to macroeconomic vulnerabilities (ADB, 2022; OECD, 2024a, 2024c; World Bank, 2025). This structural weakness in revenue collection underscores the importance of sustained reforms to strengthen both tax policy and administration.

Recent reform initiatives highlight Indonesia's commitment to reversing this trend. The enactment of the Harmonized Tax Law (*Undang-Undang Harmonisasi Peraturan Perpajakan, UU HPP*) in 2021 marked a watershed, introducing changes to broaden the tax base, increase value-added tax (VAT) rates, and establish a framework for new levies such as the carbon tax. Parallelly, the Directorate General of Taxes (DJP) launched the Core Tax Administration System (CTAS), scheduled to take effect in January 2025, to modernize core functions such as registration, filing, and compliance monitoring (Audu & Ishola, 2021; Fadipe et al., 2025; IOTA, 2020; Koskinen, 2022; KPMG, 2025; Mahusin & Prilliadi, 2025; Mugabe, 2021)). These developments represent a shift toward digitalization and systemic reform, yet they also pose risks related to implementation delays, taxpayer adaptation, and system integration (Reuters, 2025).

Indonesia's participation in global tax governance adds another layer of complexity. The adoption of the global minimum tax under the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework reflects the government's willingness to align domestic regulations with international standards, but it also increases administrative burdens (Crandall et al., 2024; Ditchfield & Howlin, 2023; Endrijaitis, 2023; Hapsari & Putra, 2025; Hosny, 2024; IMF, 2023; Mugabe, 2021; OECD, 2025d, 2024b, 2024c, 2025b). Implementing such measures requires not only technical capacity but also institutional arrangements that can ensure policy coherence, reduce compliance gaps, and safeguard fairness in cross-border taxation. In this regard, the governance architecture of revenue administration becomes as important as the reforms themselves.

A central institutional debate is whether Indonesia should establish a semi-autonomous State Revenue Authority (SRA), governed by an independent board, to replace or consolidate existing structures within the Ministry of Finance. The semi-autonomous revenue authority (SARA) model, first experimented with in Latin America in the early 1990s, has since spread to various African and Asian countries, with the promise of granting greater managerial autonomy, professionalizing human resources, and enhancing accountability for results (ADB, 2022; Bird, 2015; Crandall et al., 2024; Fjeldstad, 2014). In theory, boards provide strategic direction and insulate revenue collection from short-term political cycles, but in practice, results have been mixed and highly context-dependent (Bird, 2015; Crandall et al., 2024).

In some jurisdictions, boards have delivered clearer strategic focus, stronger risk oversight, and improved integrity frameworks. For instance, well-designed revenue authorities in Africa have demonstrated gains in compliance and taxpayer services when boards were professionalized and empowered with oversight responsibilities (Bird, 2015; Fjeldstad, 2014). In others, however, governance became blurred, accountability diluted, and operational independence led to weak integration with fiscal policymaking. This heterogeneity suggests that institutional transplantation without careful adaptation may yield limited or even adverse outcomes.

For Indonesia, assessing the desirability of an SRA board requires attention to the legal and institutional ecosystem in which such a body would operate (Hapsari & Putra, 2025). Existing frameworks, such as the 2022 Personal Data Protection Law, the Satu Data Indonesia (One Data) policy, and the *Sistem Pemerintahan Berbasis Elektronik* (SPBE, Electronic-Based Government System), already shape the principles of data governance, transparency, and accountability. Moreover, Indonesia's ongoing experiences with VAT e-invoicing (*e-Faktur*), customs modernization, and digitalization provide a rich empirical base for anticipating both the opportunities and risks of deeper institutional reform (Aslett et al., 2024; Ditchfield & Howlin, 2023; Hans & Prasetyia, 2025; IMDA, 2022; IMF, 2025; Koskinen, 2022; Mahusin & Prilliadi, 2025; Petrova, 2022). Against this backdrop, the establishment of an SRA board must be viewed not as a panacea but as one option within a broader continuum of fiscal and governance reforms.

2. MATERIALS AND METHOD

This study employs a systematic literature review (SLR) to synthesize empirical evidence and policy analysis on state revenue authority governance, organizational design, and performance, with a focus on board structures and Indonesia's institutional context. The review followed a four-stage protocol:

1) Scoping and research questions. We defined three research questions: (i) What effects do revenue authority boards have on governance, integrity, and performance? (ii) Which organizational design choices—scope, autonomy, accountability—are most salient? (iii) How do Indonesia's legal and policy frameworks condition the feasibility and desirability of an SRA and its board? Key constructs included institutional autonomy, fiduciary duty, board mandate, performance management, data governance, cybersecurity, integrity systems, and macro-fiscal coordination (ADB, 2022; Cots-Capell et al., 2025; Crandall et al., 2024; Ditchfield & Howlin, 2023; IMF, 2017, 2023, 2025; Indrawati et al., 2024; IOTA, 2020; Junquera-Varela et al., 2019; Koskinen, 2022; Kurniawan & Hidayat, 2024; Latini, 2022; Mahusin & Prilliadi, 2025; OECD, 2024b, 2024c, 2025b, 2025c, 2025d, 2025a; Pwc Indonesia, 2024; Wahyuni & Semantri, 2023; World Bank, 2020).

2) Search strategy and sources. We searched peer-reviewed journals (e.g., Journal of Modern African Studies), policy monographs (World Bank, IMF, OECD, CIAT), official regulations (UU HPP; PMK 81/2024; PDP Law 27/2022; Perpres 39/2019), and practitioner evidence on CTAS and e-invoicing. Key portals included the OECD Tax Administration Series (TAS) and Revenue Statistics, IMF Technical Notes, RA-FIT/ISORA, TADAT, and Indonesian government repositories (JDIH Kemenkeu; DJP). Our window emphasized 2014–2025 to capture both foundational and practices (Aslett et al., 2024, 2025; Cots-Capell et al., 2025; Crandall et al., 2024; Ditchfield & Howlin, 2023; Endrijaitis, 2023; Fadipe et al., 2025; Garcimartín & Miguez, 2025; Hans & Prasetyia, 2025; Hapsari & Putra, 2025; Hosny, 2024; IMDA, 2022; IMF, 2017, 2023, 2025; IOTA, 2020; Jacobsen, 2024; Kanizsai, 2025; Koskinen, 2022; Kurniawan & Hidayat, 2024; Latini, 2022; Mahusin & Prilliadi, 2025; Milosavljevic et al., 2024; OECD, 2024b, 2024c, 2024a, 2025b, 2025d, 2025a, 2025c; Pecho et al., 2024; Petrova, 2022; Pwc Indonesia, 2024; Umar & Tusubira, 2017; World Bank, 2020, 2024, 2025)

3) Eligibility and appraisal. Inclusion criteria required explicit discussion of revenue authorities, boards, tax administration governance, or Indonesian legal/digital transformation. Exclusions comprised opinion pieces without documented methodology and sources lacking verifiable provenance. We weighed credibility using publisher reputation (e.g., IMF/OECD/World Bank), peer review status, and triangulation across data sources (ISORA/RA-FIT; TADAT; official regulations) (Aslett et al., 2024,

2025; Cots-Capell et al., 2025; Crandall et al., 2024; Ditchfield & Howlin, 2023; Endrijaitis, 2023; Fadipe et al., 2025; Garcimartín & Miguez, 2025; Hans & Prasetyia, 2025; Hapsari & Putra, 2025; Hosny, 2024; IMDA, 2022; IMF, 2017, 2023, 2025; IOTA, 2020; Jacobsen, 2024; Kanizsai, 2025; Koskinen, 2022; Kurniawan & Hidayat, 2024; Latini, 2022; Luts et al., n.d.; Mahusin & Prilliadi, 2025; Milosavljevic et al., 2024; OECD, 2024b, 2024c, 2024a, 2025b, 2025d, 2025a, 2025c; Pecho et al., 2024; Petrova, 2022; Pwc Indonesia, 2024; Umar & Tusubira, 2017; World Bank, 2020, 2024, 2025)

4) Synthesis. We conducted thematic coding across autonomy and governance, performance and compliance, digital/data governance, integrity and anti-corruption, and Indonesia-specific readiness. We report narrative syntheses with targeted cross-references to comparative experiences and Indonesian policy instruments.

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS & DISCUSSION

Governance and Autonomy: The Role of Boards

Comparative studies across Latin America, Africa, and Asia indicate that the creation of boards within semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs) can enhance strategic direction, reduce short-term political interference, and embed a culture of accountability (Bird, 2015; Fjeldstad, 2014). Boards that are established with a clear fiduciary purpose are better positioned to focus on long-term revenue sustainability rather than year-to-year collection pressures (Crandall et al., 2024). In practice, this requires legislation that explicitly defines the board's authority over strategic planning, oversight of risk management, and evaluation of performance contracts for senior executives (Bird, 2015; IMF, 2024b). Without these statutory anchors, boards risk being ceremonial bodies with little influence on operational outcomes. Thus, autonomy is most effective when coupled with transparent accountability frameworks and performance benchmarks (OECD, 2024a).

However, evidence suggests that autonomy in administrative functions—such as hiring and firing staff, controlling budgets, or managing procurement—does not automatically translate into revenue gains (Bird, 2015). In some countries, expanded autonomy has even fostered rent-seeking behaviors in the absence of strong integrity safeguards and professional management practices. The effectiveness of boards, therefore, depends less on the degree of independence they hold from the Ministry of Finance and more on how well governance arrangements are aligned with broader reforms in capacity building, digitalization, and anti-corruption measures (Crandall et al., 2024; Fjeldstad, 2014). When revenue authority boards succeed, it is often because they strike a balance between autonomy and oversight, ensuring that internal flexibility is matched with external scrutiny and measurable performance indicators (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2024).


Figure 1. Radar chart showing balance across governance dimensions.

For Indonesia, the establishment of a State Revenue Authority (SRA) outside the Ministry of Finance could sharpen institutional focus on compliance management and service delivery, while freeing the ministry to concentrate on macroeconomic policy and fiscal strategy (World Bank, 2024). Yet such a shift would necessitate robust coordination mechanisms to avoid fragmentation of fiscal governance. Revenue forecasting, cash flow management, and tax policy feedback loops are tightly interwoven with administrative performance, meaning that an SRA board would need to maintain structured collaboration with the MoF (OECD, 2024). If coordination is weak, the risks include inconsistencies in fiscal planning, delays in implementing policy adjustments, and potential credibility gaps with international stakeholders (Crandall et al., 2024). Therefore, the governance design of an Indonesian SRA must prioritize institutional linkages as much as it does formal autonomy, ensuring that strategic oversight by the board complements, rather than disrupts, macro-fiscal management (Bird, 2015)

Board Design: Composition, Mandate, and Accountability

The design of a revenue authority board begins with its **composition**, which directly influences credibility, independence, and technical oversight. Comparative experience shows that boards with a mix of independent non-executive members drawn from diverse professional backgrounds—tax and customs administration, digital and data governance, law and ethics, and public-interest representation—are better positioned to offer balanced perspectives and resist capture by political or vested interests (Crandall et al., 2024). Such diversity enhances the board's ability to oversee complex modernization programs, including the implementation of core tax administration systems and the governance of large taxpayer compliance. Conversely, boards dominated by insiders or politically connected appointees risk becoming extensions of ministerial or executive power rather than effective oversight bodies (Fjeldstad, 2014)).

Figure 2: Optimal Board Composition for SRA

Equally critical is the mandate of the board, which must be clearly defined in law. International guidance, including the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT), emphasizes that effective boards focus on strategic direction, risk management, audit and integrity oversight, and high-level performance monitoring rather than day-to-day operational matters (ADB, 2022; Bird, 2015; Fadipe et al., 2025; Hapsari & Putra, 2025; IMF, 2017, 2023; Pecho et al., 2024; Umar & Tusubira, 2017). When boards overstep into operational functions such as audit case selection or taxpayer service delivery, they undermine the commissioner's authority and dilute accountability (Bird, 2015). Conversely, overly vague or narrow mandates can render boards ceremonial and ineffective. Indonesia, in contemplating a State Revenue Authority, would therefore need to legislate a statute that enshrines strategic, not operational, responsibilities for the board, backed by structured committees (e.g., audit, integrity, digital/data).

Finally, accountability and transparency mechanisms underpin board legitimacy. Comparative evidence highlights the importance of transparent appointment and removal processes, conflict-of-interest safeguards, and mandatory cooling-off periods for members drawn from industries subject to taxation (Crandall et al., 2024). Explicit obligations for the board to report annually to Parliament and publish performance assessments ensure alignment with democratic oversight and build public trust (OECD, 2024). Without these mechanisms, boards risk either institutionalized weak oversight or managerial interference that undermines administrative performance. For Indonesia, embedding accountability clauses and public reporting requirements in the founding statute of an SRA board would not only reinforce fiscal transparency but also align with broader governance reforms under the *Satu Data Indonesia* and *SPBE* frameworks.

Organizational Scope: Integrating Tax and Customs

The integration of tax and customs functions within a single revenue authority has been widely discussed in the literature as a means of strengthening compliance management and efficiency. By consolidating functions, revenue administrations are able to reduce duplication in processes such as taxpayer identification, risk analysis, and audit, thereby delivering a more seamless experience for taxpayers and traders alike (Fjeldstad, 2014). Integration also facilitates the development of comprehensive compliance risk models that link import/export data with domestic tax obligations, allowing authorities to detect under-reporting and transfer pricing more effectively (OECD, 2024). Countries that have successfully pursued integration, such as South Africa and Rwanda, demonstrate that coordinated tax–customs approaches can improve revenue yields and reduce compliance gaps when combined with strong governance and IT infrastructure.

However, the literature also cautions that integration is not without risks. When pursued without proper systems alignment or adequate change management, merging tax and customs agencies can lead to transition costs, cultural clashes, and coordination failures (Bird, 2015). For example, differences in organizational culture—tax authorities traditionally being rule-based and compliance-driven, while customs administrations are often more operational and enforcement-oriented—can generate tensions that undermine reform objectives. Without harmonized human resource policies, training, and career structures, integration risks creating institutional silos within the new organization rather than eliminating them. Furthermore, partial or poorly sequenced integration can disrupt service delivery, creating uncertainty for both taxpayers and customs brokers (Crandall et al., 2024).

Figure 3: Staged Integration Between Tax and Customs in Indonesia

In the Indonesian context, the challenges and opportunities of integration are particularly salient. The Directorate General of Customs and Excise has already achieved a high level of digitization through systems such as the National Single Window, while the Directorate General of Taxes is undergoing a significant digital transformation through the Core Tax Administration System (CTAS) rollout. This divergence in system maturity underscores the need for a carefully staged integration strategy. An SRA board

tasked with overseeing integration must prioritize data architecture compatibility, adopt common taxpayer identification standards, and align risk management frameworks. At the same time, robust change management processes—including staff training, stakeholder communication, and phased system integration—are essential to ensure that potential synergies are realized without compromising service continuity or fiscal stability (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2024).

Digital Transformation and Data Governance

The modernization of revenue administration in Indonesia is anchored in the implementation of the Core Tax Administration System (CTAS), which aims to overhaul registration, filing, payment, audit, and collections. International evidence suggests that tax administrations that successfully integrate core systems renewal with complementary tools—such as electronic invoicing (e-invoicing), real-time transaction monitoring, and advanced analytics—experience measurable improvements in compliance, efficiency, and service delivery (OECD, 2024; CIAT, 2025). For example, Latin American countries with e-invoicing systems observed significant reductions in VAT evasion and administrative costs, outcomes that Indonesia seeks to replicate through its e-Faktur platform. By leveraging VAT transaction data, CTAS has the potential to enhance compliance risk management and taxpayer segmentation strategies, strengthening Indonesia's fiscal capacity in the medium term (OECD, 2024).

Despite its promise, CTAS has faced operational challenges. The system's go-live in January 2025 encountered severe instability, requiring a temporary fallback to the legacy system and triggering taxpayer frustration (KPMG, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Such disruptions underscore the risks of large-scale digital transformation when delivery assurance mechanisms are insufficient. Comparative experiences highlight the importance of strong governance arrangements, where independent oversight structures—including a board-level Digital & Data Committee—monitor project milestones, cybersecurity safeguards, and system resilience (Crandall et al., 2024). In Indonesia, an SRA board with such a committee could play a pivotal role in ensuring that CTAS rollouts are backed by robust change management, contingency planning, and external audits. This would help safeguard trust among taxpayers and maintain business continuity even during technical failures.

Equally critical are the legal and policy frameworks that define data governance and privacy standards. The enactment of the Personal Data Protection (PDP) Law (Law 27/2022) places binding obligations on public institutions to ensure data minimization, secure processing, and transparency in data usage. Furthermore, the Satu Data Indonesia regulation (Perpres 39/2019) and the Electronic-Based Government System (SPBE) provide national frameworks for interoperability, standardized metadata, and accountability in public sector data management (OGP, 2019). For a prospective SRA, embedding these requirements into its statute and board policies would not only enhance compliance with national law but also build public confidence in the authority's stewardship of sensitive taxpayer data. By institutionalizing governance structures that balance digital innovation with privacy, accountability, and resilience, Indonesia can transform CTAS from a technical upgrade into a pillar of transparent and trustworthy state revenue administration.

Integrity and Anti-Corruption

Integrity is a cornerstone of effective revenue administration, as tax and customs officials exercise significant discretion in assessment, collection, and enforcement activities. Empirical studies demonstrate that weaknesses in internal control systems often create opportunities for rent-seeking, collusion, and illicit revenue leakage (Bird, 2015). Mechanisms such as staff rotation, mandatory asset declarations, and strong internal audit systems have been shown to reduce exposure to corruption and improve trust in tax institutions (Fjeldstad & Moore, 2009). In many countries, the establishment of specialized integrity offices within revenue authorities has served as a deterrent against misconduct and has helped build a compliance culture rooted in fairness and accountability. For Indonesia, where corruption remains a systemic concern, embedding these mechanisms into a future State Revenue Authority (SRA) would be fundamental to ensuring the credibility and effectiveness of reforms.

At the governance level, board oversight through dedicated Audit & Ethics Committees is vital. These committees are responsible not only for monitoring compliance with integrity standards but also for ensuring effective coordination with external watchdogs such as Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK*). International experience shows that external partnerships enhance the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption safeguards by ensuring independent investigations and limiting conflicts of interest (Crandall et al., 2024). Such oversight must be complemented by whistleblower protection mechanisms to encourage reporting of misconduct without fear of retaliation. Transparent handling of cases, combined with regular public disclosure of integrity performance indicators, strengthens accountability and public confidence in revenue administration.

Recent civil society assessments in Indonesia underscore persistent challenges in anti-corruption enforcement, including limited political will, weakening of institutional safeguards, and insufficient transparency in enforcement processes (ICW, 2024; Transparency International Indonesia, 2024). In this environment, an SRA board would need to play a proactive role by setting measurable integrity key performance indicators (KPIs), publishing annual integrity reports, and embedding anti-corruption safeguards into human resource policies and case management systems. By institutionalizing integrity frameworks and reporting requirements, Indonesia can align revenue governance with international best practices and reinforce public trust in its revenue authority.

Performance and Tax Effort

Tax performance is commonly measured by the tax-to-GDP ratio, a key indicator of the government's ability to mobilize domestic resources relative to the size of the economy. Indonesia's tax ratio, averaging around 10–12 percent of GDP in recent years, is significantly lower than regional peers such as Vietnam and Thailand, and far below OECD averages (OECD, 2024; World Bank, 2024). Scholars have highlighted that such performance gaps are not solely the result of tax policy choices, but also of administrative effectiveness, taxpayer compliance culture, and the state's ability to enforce tax obligations fairly (Bird, 2014). Improving tax effort thus requires a holistic approach, combining institutional strengthening with reforms in policy design and enforcement practices.

Empirical studies show that revenue authorities with strong performance management frameworks—including measurable indicators of filing, payment, audit, and arrears collection—tend to achieve more sustainable improvements in revenue mobilization (Crandall et al., 2024). For Indonesia, embedding such metrics into the governance framework of a State Revenue Authority could provide a basis for holding management accountable and aligning administrative strategies with fiscal targets. Furthermore, international benchmarking tools such as the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) and the International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) offer structured ways to assess performance against global standards (TADAT Secretariat, 2019). By systematically adopting these frameworks, Indonesia can move beyond ad hoc reforms and build a culture of continuous improvement in tax administration.

Finally, raising tax effort in Indonesia must also account for structural economic challenges, including a large informal sector, frAgmented data systems, and uneven taxpayer compliance across regions (Fjeldstad, 2014; OECD, 2024). The introduction of digital platforms such as e-Faktur and CTAS offers opportunities to expand the tax net, but their success depends on effective integration with third-party data and consistent enforcement. A board-level oversight mechanism could ensure that performance targets are transparent, realistic, and accompanied by strong monitoring and evaluation. Over time, linking performance measurement with integrity safeguards and taxpayer service improvements can help Indonesia gradually converge toward regional tax capacity norms, thereby expanding fiscal space for inclusive development.

Indonesia's Revenue Context and Reform Trajectory

Indonesia's revenue mobilization trajectory underscores both persistent structural challenges and recent reform momentum. According to the OECD Revenue Statistics, Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio stood at approximately 12 percent in 2022–2023, markedly below the Asia-Pacific regional average and far below OECD norms (OECD, 2024, 2025). This relatively low ratio reflects a narrow tax base, high informality, and compliance gaps, which constrain fiscal space for infrastructure, health, and social spending. The mobilization challenge is therefore not only technical but also institutional, requiring reforms that simultaneously enhance policy design, strengthen administration, and build taxpayer trust (World Bank, 2024).

Policy reforms have sought to address these weaknesses through both base-broadening and digitalization. The Harmonized Tax Law (UU HPP) raised the value-added tax (VAT) rate from 10 to 11 percent, with a legislated pathway to 12 percent, while expanding the tax base through new instruments such as carbon taxation and adjustments to income tax thresholds. These measures aim to improve revenue buoyancy but also increase the burden on tax administration to enforce compliance and manage distributional impacts. At the same time, the rollout of the Core Tax Administration System (CTAS) represents the most ambitious attempt at modernization in decades, promising integrated registration, filing, and audit processes that could significantly improve compliance management and service delivery (KPMG, 2025; OECD, 2024).

The evolving international tax environment compounds these domestic reforms. Indonesia's adoption of the OECD/G20 global minimum tax, effective 2025, introduces additional complexity in cross-border tax administration and multinational compliance (OECD, 2025; Reuters, 2025). This, places a premium on effective governance structures capable of managing technical,

operational, and reputational risks. In this context, the establishment of a semi-autonomous State Revenue Authority (SRA) board is not valuable merely for granting autonomy, but rather for institutionalizing strategy, assurance, integrity, and transparency across the revenue system. By embedding governance functions, such as risk oversight, integrity monitoring, and performance assurance, within a board framework, Indonesia can reinforce both the credibility and resilience of its revenue reforms.

4. IMPLICATIONS

The practical implications of this review emphasize the translation of high-level governance principles into concrete operational mechanisms. First, statute design should clearly codify the fiduciary duty of the board to act in the public interest, establish a strategic oversight mandate, and mandate accountability through annual reporting to both Parliament and the public. Second, the governance of digital transformation must be reinforced by a dedicated board committee tasked with delivery assurance, including stage-gate approvals, independent system testing, incident reviews, and resilience planning for CTAS and related platforms. Third, the operationalization of data governance requires the integration of *Satu Data Indonesia*, *SPBE*, and the Personal Data Protection Law, which implies clear data stewardship roles, enforcement of data minimization, systematic privacy impact assessments, and audit trails for analytics. Fourth, integrity safeguards such as staff rotation, asset disclosure, whistleblower channels, and safeguards against biased case selection should be formalized through measurable key performance indicators (KPIs) and routine public reporting. Fifth, macro-fiscal coordination between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and a potential State Revenue Authority (SRA) should be structured through memoranda of understanding that regulate forecasting, cash management, and tax policy feedback loops. Finally, performance contracts with the SRA's chief executive should be benchmarked against ISORA and TADAT indicators, supported by public dashboards that make results accessible to citizens and stakeholders.

From a policy perspective, the sequencing of reforms will determine the credibility and effectiveness of institutional transformation. Stabilizing CTAS and consolidating taxpayer service redesign should precede any organizational restructuring, as disruptions at this stage could undermine confidence in reform. A prudent path forward is to pilot board-style oversight within the current MoF framework, incorporating independent experts and transparent reporting obligations. This pilot approach would de-risk transition, sharpen statutory provisions, and demonstrate the added value of board-level governance before embarking on a full-scale institutional shift. Lessons from comparative international experience caution against assuming that autonomy alone will solve revenue challenges; rather, durable improvements stem from investments in professional capacity, process redesign, and robust data systems.

The broader implications for Indonesia are strategic and long-term. Institutionalizing governance principles in revenue administration will strengthen transparency, build taxpayer trust, and enhance international credibility in Indonesia's fiscal institutions. Embedding board oversight in areas such as CTAS delivery, data stewardship, and integrity monitoring not only supports immediate revenue mobilization but also positions Indonesia to navigate complex challenges such as the implementation of the global minimum tax. More fundamentally, strengthening revenue governance contributes directly to the state's ability to finance inclusive growth, infrastructure, and social welfare, thereby advancing Indonesia's aspiration to achieve high-income status by 2045.

5. CONCLUSION

Conclusion

This systematic literature review demonstrates that the establishment of a State Revenue Authority (SRA) board for Indonesia presents both significant opportunities and notable challenges. Boards can create institutional value when they are designed with clear statutory mandates, balanced and independent membership, and strong accountability mechanisms. Specifically, the presence of specialized committees—covering audit and integrity, digital and data governance, and risk and strategy—can help ensure that core tax and customs functions are managed with strategic foresight and insulated from undue political influence. International evidence suggests that well-governed boards enhance compliance management, strengthen integrity safeguards, and ensure that modernization projects such as CTAS are implemented with delivery assurance and resilience.

At the same time, the review emphasizes that structural autonomy alone is insufficient to guarantee improved revenue performance. In practice, tax outcomes are shaped by the interaction of sound policy design, organizational capability, taxpayer service quality, and the credibility of enforcement systems. For Indonesia, immediate priorities include stabilizing the rollout of CTAS, embedding

robust data governance practices under the Satu Data Indonesia and SPBE frameworks, and operationalizing integrity mechanisms aligned with the Personal Data Protection (PDP) Law. Whether pursued under a formal SRA or within the existing Ministry of Finance framework, these priorities are fundamental to improving the country's revenue ratio and building public trust in the administration. An SRA board, therefore, should be seen as one potential institutional mechanism to consolidate these reforms rather than a standalone solution.

Limitations

The review is subject to several limitations. First, the available evidence is heterogeneous, with wide variation in country experiences and outcomes of SRA boards. Comparative studies are often descriptive rather than causal, making it difficult to isolate the effect of board structures from broader fiscal and administrative reforms. Second, much of the material relies on institutional sources such as IMF, OECD, and World Bank reports rather than peer-reviewed journal articles. While these sources are authoritative for administrative practice, they may lack the methodological rigor and theoretical framing of academic studies. Finally, given the recency of Indonesia's reforms, including CTAS implementation and the Harmonization of Tax Regulations (UU HPP), the empirical evidence base is still emerging, limiting the ability to draw definitive conclusions about long-term outcomes.

Future Research Agenda

Future research should focus on filling these evidence gaps by developing quasi-experimental evaluations of board design features, particularly their impact on compliance rates, taxpayer behavior, and organizational productivity. Longitudinal studies tracking the stabilization of CTAS and its effect on taxpayer experience will be critical for assessing whether digital transformation delivers sustained improvements. Additionally, as Indonesia and other jurisdictions experiment with artificial intelligence and machine learning for compliance risk management, research should examine governance frameworks for algorithmic accountability under evolving privacy regimes. Finally, greater attention should be devoted to analyzing tax–customs data fusion, particularly its implications for trade facilitation, VAT productivity, and the reduction of revenue leakages at the border. Together, these research streams would provide policymakers with a more robust evidence base to guide the design and governance of an Indonesian SRA board.

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